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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-EQuAL FOOTING DOCTRINE DOES NOT RE-
QUIRE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO RESOLVE
OWNERSHIP OF LAND UNDERLYING NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
WHICH ARE NOT INTERSTATE BOUNDARIES. Oregon ex rel. State
Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 97 S. Ct. 582
(1977).
In Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel
Co.,' Oregon brought an ejectment action against the Corvallis Sand
and Gravel Company, claiming title to two separate parcels of land in
question. The land was part of the riverbed of the Willamette, a' nav-
igable waterway. The first parcel had been part of the Willamette
riverbed since before Oregon was admitted to the Union. The second
parcel, known as the Fischer Cut lands, had become a riverbed in 1909,
after statehood, following a major flood.2 The trial court awarded the
former parcel to the state, after finding that sovereign title to the river-
bed had vested in the state at the time of its admission to the Union,
and that it had never conveyed that title. The Fischer 'Cut lands, how-
ever, were awarded to the company under the doctrine of avulsion.'
1. 97 S. Ct. 582 (1977).
2. The parcels of land in question and the general topography of the immediate
area are depicted in the map below, which is reproduced from State v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel Co., 18 Or. App. 524, -, 526 P.2d 469, 473 (1974). As the court stated:
Prior to the latter part of 1909, the northerly portion of the Willamette River
now shown ... as the East Channel was the main channel of the river.
Prior to 1909 the main channel veered to the east from a point just south
of... Parcels 2A, 2B and 2C, went around the east side of Fischer Island
and rejoined what is now the main channel at a point to the northwest of
... [those parcels]. . . . Parcels 2A, 2B and 2C . . . described as the
Fischer Cut area was a minor non-navigable channel which was submerged
only seasonally. However, following a storm and flood in late 1909, the area
known as Fischer Cut became the main channel of the river and the East
Channel gradually became non-navigable. Id.
3. Avulsion occurs when "a stream suddenly and perceptibly abandons its old chan-
nel" Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 624 (1912). If the waterway was
a boundary, avulsion has no effect on it; the boundary remains where the pre-avulsion
channel was situated. Id.; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 173 (1918); St. Louis
v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 245 (1891).
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The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.4 Believing
that it was bound by Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona to apply federal
common law to the dispute, the intermediate 4appellate court held that
the company had acquired title to the Fischer Cut lands either by virtue
of the federal theory of avulsion 6 or the federal exception to its accre-
tion rule.7 The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed with minor modifi-
UECA. INC. Consulting Engineers
Approx. scale I" - 1600'
4-
4. 18 Or. App. 524, 526 P.2d 469 (1974).
5. 414 U.S. 313 (1973). Bonelli was decided while an appeal to the state inter-
mediate court was pending in Corvallis.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. The accretion rule vests title in the riparian owner of the newly formed land
created "by the gradual deposit of soil due to the action of a bounding river or other
body of water." Bauman v. Choctaw-Chickasaw Nations, 333 F.2d 785, 789 (10th
Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted). The exception to the accretion rule holds:
[Where a river changes its main channel, not by excavating, passing over,
and then filling the intervening place between its old and its new main channel,
but by flowing around this intervening land, which never becomes in the mean-
time its main channel, and the change from the old to the new main channel
is wrought during many years by the gradual or occasional increase from year
to year of the proportion of the waters of the river passing over the course
which eventually becomes the new main channel, and the decrease from year
to year of the proportion of its waters passing through the old main channel
until the greater part of its waters flow- through the new main channel, the
[Vol. 12:59S
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss3/9
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cations' and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' The
majority1 ° overruled Bonelli, holding that Oregon law should be applied
on remand to resolve the question of title of the riverbed. 1 In so hold-
ing, the Supreme Court returned to a firmly established doctrine,
thereby declining to follow a decision which could have a disruptive
effect on many land titles and which ignored the varying policies of
the states with regard to riparian lands.' 2
The issue before the Court in Corvallis was whether federal com-
mon law should have been applied to determine the ownership of the
riverbed in dispute. Resolution of this issue turned on the proper ap-
plication of the equal footing doctrine. Equal footing requires that
"new states since admitted [to the Union be afforded] . .. the same
rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction . . .as the original States possess
within their respective borders."' 3 In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan," the
Supreme Court applied the equal footing doctrine to hold that newly
admitted states acquired title to the riverbeds of all navigable water-
ways within their boundaries.' 5 With vesting of title in the states, state
law would be determinative of questions relating to the transfer of title
and other property matters.
Yet federal common law has been applied to decide issues regard-
ing riparian rights and title to lands adjacent to or underlying navigable
waterways. However, cases where federal common law supplied the
rule have involved situations where the public interest required a uni-
boundary line between the estates remains in the old channel subject to such
changes in that channel as are wrought by erosion or accretion while the
water remains a running stream.
18 Or. App. at -, 526 P.2d at 477 (quoting Commissioners v. United States, 270
F. 110, 113-14 (8th Cir. 1920)).
8. 272 Or. 545, 536 P.2d 517, rehearing denied, 272 Or. 545, 538 P.2d 70 (1975).
The modifications dealt with certain factual questions relating to the precise amount
of land to be included in one of the parcels.
9. 423 U.S. 1048 (1976).
10. Corvallis was a 6-3 decision. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion
and was joined therein by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting statement and Justice Marshall wrote
a dissenting opinion in which Justice White joined.
11. 97 S. Ct. at 592.
12. See, e.g., Note, The Federal Rule of Accretion and California Coastal Protec-
tion, 48 S. CAtF. L. REv. 1457 (1975).
13. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867) (footnote omitted).
14. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
15. Id. In Mumford, the Court reaffirmed its view by holding that the thirteen
original colonies succeeded to the rights and title of the English Crown in all soils
underlying navigable rivers and that these rights also passed to the later-created states.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 436. The foundation of the equal footing doctrine is the tenth
amendment. See id. at 436.
1977]
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form rule for the nation. Thus it has been applied in cases involving
navigable waters which formed interstate boundaries 6 and where con-
flicting claims to the same land were made by federal and state pat-
entees.17  Moreover, until recently, except in situations involving inter-
state boundaries, federal law only defined the boundaries of the states
when they were admitted into the Union; thereafter, state law control-
led subsequent issues of title and dispositions of that land.'8
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona19 expanded the situations where fed-
eral common law would control. In Bonelli the question was whether
the state or plaintiff Bonelli held title to certain riparian land on the
east bank of the Colorado River, a navigable waterway which, like the
Willamette in Corvallis, was not an interstate boundary. The land had
originally been granted under a federal patent to Bonelli's predecessor
in title. Much of this land was submerged by the gradual eastward
movement of the river, with Arizona automatically acquiring title to the
newly created riverbed. In 1959, a project of the Federal Bureau of
Reclamation resulted in the re-emergence of the Bonelli land.2" Ap-
plication of the state's rule of avulsion did not divest the state of title
to this land;21 the United States Supreme Court, however, held that fed-
eral common law applied, awarding title to Bonelli under the federal
rule of accretion. 22
The Bonelli Court agreed that the equal footing doctrine vested
title to the changing riverbed in the state, but the majority2 took a
further step and framed the issue as follows:
The issue before us is not what rights the State has accorded
private owners in lands which the State holds as sovereign;
but, rather, how far the State's sovereign right extends under
the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act-
whether the State retains title to the lands formerly beneath
the stream of the Colorado River or whether that title is de-
feasible by the withdrawal of those waters.24
16. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143
U.S. 359 (1892).
17. See, e.g., Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
18. See cases cited at notes 16-17 supra.
19. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
20. Id. at 316.
21. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971).
22. 414 U.S. at 325-32.
23. Bonelli was a 7-1 decision. Justice Stewart dissented, while Justice Rehnquist
did not participate. Justice Stewart joined in overruling Bonelli in Corvallis. See note
10 supra.
24. 414 U.S. at 319-20. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
[Vol. 12:593
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The Court thus assumed that the equal footing doctrine not only vested
title to submerged lands in the states, but also that the doctrine deter-
mined the rules to be applied to resolve ownership disputes arising
from subsequent alterations in those submerged lands.
Armed with this assumption, the Court criticized the state court's
interpretation of the equal footing doctrine, which allowed application
of state law to vest title to the re-emerged land in the state. The Court
held, in this regard, that the "equal-footing doctrine was never intended
to provide a State with a windfall of thousands of acres of dry land ex-
posed when the main thread of a navigable stream is changed."2 5
Furthermore, the Court found that no state interest would be served
by awarding the land to the state.2"
Mr. Justice Stewart dissented in Bonelli. He asserted that the
equal footing doctrine gave Arizona sovereignty over the beds of all
navigable rivers within its boundaries; therefore, the state must neces-
sarily have the power to apply its own law to resolve any subsequent
disputes over title to that property.27 In short, the federal law deter-
mines only the original extent of the absolute grant to the state; there-
after state law must control any disposition of the land.28
Justice Stewart's dissent is the position now espoused by the Cor-
vallis majority. The Court cited Wilcox v. Jackson29 for the proposition
that while federal law must control the determination of whether title
to land has passed from the national to the state government, state law
must control all subsequent dispositions of the property that has been
absolutely vested in it by the equal footing doctrine.80 The Court pro-
claimed that it was returning to a rationale based on a line of cases
dating back to 1845. 31 With the repudiation of Bonelli's expansive ap-
(1970), had no bearing on the outcome of Bonelli or Corvallis. As the Court in
Corvallis observed:
mhe Submerged Lands Act did not alter the scope or effect of the equal
footing doctrine, nor did it alter State property law regarding riparian owner-
ship. The effect of the Act was merely to confirm the States' title to the
beds of navigable waters within their boundaries as against any claim of the
United States Government.
97 S. Ct. 587, n.4.
25. 414 U.S. at 322 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 323-25.
27. Id. at 333.
28. Id. at 336-37.
29. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839).
30. 97 .Ct. at 587.
31. Id. at 592. However, federal common law may still supply the applicable rule
for ocean-front property under the rationale of Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967) (applying federal rule of accretion to such land). The majority in Corvallis,
1977]
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plication of federal common law, state law will hereafter govern the
impact that accretion, avulsion and re-emergence will have on the
ownership of land surrounding or underlying navigable waterways
which do not form interstate boundaries or are otherwise situated so
as to call for the application of a national uniform rule.
The importance of this doctrinal reversal is emphasized by an
illustration of the differences which result from the application of fed-
eral common law and state law in California. 32  For example, the Cali-
fornia rule of accretion classifies, as a general rule, all artificial coastal
accretions as tidelands,38 thereby subjecting the land to the California
tideland trust.14  The state rule gives upland owners the benefit of all
natural accretions.8 5  The federal rule of accretion, on the other hand,
makes no distinctions between artificial and natural accretions and
classifies all accretions as uplands, thereby avoiding subjection to the
state trust.36  Thus, the application of the federal common law thwarts
the express state public policies of coastal protection8 7 and free beach
access3" which the California tideland trust attempts to promote.
Other states also have their own unique interests in riparian lands
and in implementing their own varying public policies with respect to
while recognizing that Hughes, like Bonelli, gave an expansive interpretation of prior
case law in order to apply federal law, declined to address the issue, noting that Hughes
was neither considered by itself in Bonelli nor relied on by the Oregon courts in the
present case. 97 S. Ct. at 590, n.6. The dissent took the position that Hughes was
overruled by the majority's holding in Corvallis. 97 S. Ct. at 593.
32. The State of California, concerned about the potential impact of Corvallis,
moved for permission to participate in the case as amicus curiae. The Supreme Court
denied its motion. 424 U.S. 963 (1976).
33. City of Los Angeles v. Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 275 P. 789 (1929); see gener-
ally 65 CJ.S. Navigable Waters § 82(1-2) (1966).
34. The tidelands trust is essentially a land-use restriction. It has been defined
as a tripartite restriction on the government's authority over the land:
[F]irst, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public
purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; second,
the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the
property must be maintained for particular types of uses.., such as naviga-
tion, recreation, or fishery, or . . . uses . . . in some sense related to the
natural uses peculiar to that resource.
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MIc. I Rv. 471, 477 (1970). See also Comment, The Tideland Trust: Eco-
nomic Currents in A Traditional Legal Doctrine, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 826 (1974).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. See, e.g., Beaver v. United States, 350 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 937 (1966).
37. California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30010 (West
Supp. 1977); See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971).
38. CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE §§ 30000-30010 (West Supp. 1977). See Note, Public
Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564 (1970).
598
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those lands.3 9 The great geographical diversity and needs of states,
the tenth amendment, 40 and the rationale of the line of cases extending
over a century and a half all point toward permitting each state to de-
cide questions such as the ones presented by Corvallis.
The equal footing doctrine and certain factual patterns, such as
the presence of prestatehood foreign patents, may require a federal de-
termination of the extent of original land holdings. Once this decision
has been made, however, all subsequent changes in title brought about
by such changes as accretion or avulsion should be governed by the
law of the state involved.41  The United States Supreme Court has re-
turned to this salutary rule in Corvallis.
Chris E. Hagberg
39. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 816, 410 P.2d 20 (1966), rev'd
sub norn. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (Washington state rule classifies
all accretions, both natural and artificial, as tidelands, subject to the tidelands trust);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (duscussing state's multiple interests
in its navigable waters and creation of a public trust to promote those interests).
Oklahoma appears to follow the federal rules of accretion and avulsion in advancing
its interests in its waters, although there is scant authority on the question. See Olsen
v. Jones, 412 P.2d 162 (Okla. 1966); State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v.
Warden, 200 Okla. 613, 198 P.2d 402 (1948); City of Tulsa v. Commissioners of Land
Office, 187 Okla. 82, 101 P.2d 246 (1940); Goins v. Merryman, 183 Okla. 155, 80
P.2d 268 (1938); Willett v. Miller, 176 Okla. 278, 55 P.2d 90 (1936). See also Bauman
v. Choctaw-Chickasaw Nations, 333 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1964).
40. See note 15 supra.
41. The federal rules will still govern interstate boundary disputes involving naviga-
ble waterways. See note 16 supra: and accompanying text.
1977]
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